In this paper, we construct a 3-round zero-knowledge protocol for any NP language. Our protocol achieves weaker notions of zero-knowledge than black-box simulation zero-knowledge. Therefore, our result does not contradict the triviality result of Goldreich and Krawczyk [GoKr96] which shows that 3-round black-box simulation zero-knowledge exist only for BPP languages. Our main contribution is to provide a non-black-box simulation technique. Whether there exists such a simulation technique was a major open problem in the theory of zero-knowledge. Our simulation technique is based on a non-standard computational assumption related to the DiffieHellman problem, which was originally proposed by Damgård [Da91]. This assumption, which we call the DA-1, says that, given randomly chosen instance of the discrete logarithm problem (p, q, g, g a ), it is infeasible to compute (B, X) such that X = B a mod p without knowing the value b satisfying B = g b mod p. Our protocol achieves different notions of zero-knowledge under different variants of DA-1. All variants are augmented by an auxiliary-input. Under non-uniform DA-1 w.r.t. auxiliaryinput of restricted length, it achieves the notion of non-uniform zero-knolwedge. Furthermore, under the stronger variant called non-uniform DA-1 w.r.t. auxiliary-input of non-restricted length, it achieves the notion of auxiliary-input non-uniform zero-knowledge. Unfortunately, these variants have some kind of reverse-engineering property which seems to be unreasonable. It also achieves the standard notions called GMR zero-knowledge and auxiliary-input zeroknowledge under uniform variants of these assumptions, but they have the stronger reverseengineering property.
Introduction
The fundamental notion of zero-knowledge (ZK) introduced by Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff plays a central role in modern cryptography [GMR85] . In this paper, we investigate the methodology underlying ZK and construct a 3-round ZK protocol for NP.
Background on Zero-Knowledge Protocol
Consider an interactive protocol in which a prover convinces a verifier that a common input x belongs to some underlying language L (In this paper, L is in NP). The length of x is denoted by n and one measures complexity in terms of n. The verifier is always a probabilistic polynomial-time machine. We focus on two properties: "soundness" and "zero-knowledge." Each can be formalized in two ways depending on whether or not we restrict the adversary (the cheating prover and the cheating verifier) to a resource bounded machine.
The soundness asks that if x / ∈ L, any cheating prover can not convince the verifier to accept, except with negligible error probability. This notion is formalized in two ways: "proofs" and "arguments." These provide the statistical soundness and the computational soundness, respectively. The former requires that even a computationally unrestricted cheating prover should be unable to make the verifier accept x / ∈ L, except with negligible probability [GMR85] . On the other hand, the latter requires that any cheating prover restricted to probabilistic polynomial-time should be unable to make the verifier accept x / ∈ L, except with negligible probability [BrCr86] [BCC88] . Although the notion of arguments is weaker than the notion of proofs, it is good enough for cryptographic applications. The soundness of arguments will typically depend on the complexity assumptions such as the discrete logarithm assumption. In this paper whenever we talk of proofs or arguments, we always mean ones with negligible error probability.
Zero-knowledge asks that when x ∈ L, an interaction with the prover yields no information (other than the fact x ∈ L) to any cheating verifier. This notion is also formalized in two ways: "statistical ZK" (SZK) and "computational ZK" (CZK). The former requires that even a computationally unrestricted cheating verifier will gain no useful information, except with negligible probability. On the other hand, the latter requires that any cheating verifier restricted to probabilistic polynomial-time will gain no useful information, except with negligible probability. Clearly, SZK is a special case of CZK.
In this paper, unless stated explicitly, ZK protocols mean CZK arguments. Our proposed protocol is a CZK argument.
Classification of Zero-Knowledge
There are several notions of ZK. Our proposed protocol achieves four different notions of ZK, called GMR zero-knowledge, non-uniform zero-knowledge, non-uniform auxiliary-input zero-knowledge, and auxiliary-input zero-knowledge, under different computational assumptions. We will begin by discussing the relationships among them.
ZK was originally formalized in [GMR85] as follows: For any probabilistic polynomial-time machine V (the cheating verifier), there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time machine S V (the simulator) which produces a probability distribution which is computationally indistinguishable from the distribution of conversations of V with the prover P . This original definition which we call GMR-ZK is not suitable for cryptographic applications since it is not closed under sequential composition [GoKr96] . In cryptographic applications, the cheating verifier may have some additional a-priori information.
In order to overcome the above problem, the notion of auxiliary-input zero-knowledge (AIZK) was introduced in [GoOr94] (The similar notion appeared in [TW87] [GMR89]). AIZK is defined by augmenting GMR-ZK by an auxiliary-input. That is, the simulation requirement is extended to deal with non-uniform verifiers, which are allowed to take an auxiliary-input (an arbitrary string of polynomial length). The simulator is also allowed to take the same auxiliary-input used by the verifier. It was shown that AIZK is closed under sequential composition [GoOr94] .
The above two notions only require that, for each cheating verifier V , there exists a simulator S V . It is important to note that S V is allowed to examine the internal state of the cheating verifier V . On the other hand, black-box simulation zero-knowledge (BSZK) requires that there exists a single universal simulator that, using any non-uniform cheating verifier V as a black-box, succeeds in simulating the interaction of V with the prover P (Note that the order of quantifiers is reversed). That is, the simulator is only allowed to simply observe the input/output behavior of V . Although BSZK is most restrictive among three notions, almost all known ZK protocols are BSZK 1 . It was shown that BSZK implies AIZK [GoOr94] .
All the above definitions are "semi-uniform" in the sense that it uses uniform machines but quantifies over all common inputs x ∈ L. In the totally non-uniform formalization of ZK, all machines are modeled by a polynomial-size circuit family [Go93] . We consider two non-uniform formalizations, i.e., non-uniform zero-knowledge and auxiliary-input non-uniform zero-knowledge.
Non-uniform zero-knowledge (NUZK) is a non-uniform variant of GMR-ZK. That is, it requires that for any polynomial-size circuit family V , there exists a (probabilistic) polynomial-size circuit family S V which produces a probability distribution which is computationally indistinguishable from the distribution of conversations of V with the prover P . It is important to note that NUZK does not imply GMR-ZK [Go98b] . In fact, one can devise artificial protocols for sparse languages such that it achieves the notion of NUZK but not GMR-ZK. For example, consider the following interactive proof for a sparse language L sp = {1 n } n∈N . The prover sends the verifier the value of a hard function K(·) on the common input x ∈ L sp (e.g., K is a non-recursive function indicating whether the nth Turing machine accepts every input). The verifier accepts if and only if x is of the form 1 n . Certainly, this is an interactive proof for L sp . It is not GMR-ZK since there is no way to simulate in probabilistic polynomial-time the conversation in which the prover sends the value of K(x). On the other hand, it is still NUZK since the simulator may just incorporate the hard bit K(x). This shows that NUZK is a very weak notion of ZK and does not satisfy the intuitive requirement of ZK. Also, the result of [GoKr96] can be extended to show that NUZK is not closed under sequential composition.
Auxiliary-input non-uniform zero-knowledge (AINUZK) is defined by augmenting the notion of NUZK by an auxiliary-input. The above interactive proof for a sparse language achieves not only NUZK but also AINUZK. That is, AINUZK also does not satisfy the intuitive requirement of ZK. However, AINUZK has an advantage over NUZK since it is closed under sequential composition [GoOr94] [Go93] .
Let Cl(def ) denote the class of all interactive proofs and arguments satisfying the requirements of definition def . In light of the above, it holds that
The only exception is the contrived protocol constructed by Goldreich and Krawczyk for the purpose of separating GMR-ZK and AIZK [GoKr96] . They used the black-box simulation of uniform cheating verifier rather than nonuniform cheating verifier. However, their simulation technique does not seem useful for constructing 3-round zeroknowledge protocols for a non-trivial language.
and
It is an open problem whether Cl(BSZK) equals Cl(AIZK) [GoOr94] .
Motivation and Contributions
The round complexity, the number of messages exchanged, is a standard complexity measure for the efficiency of ZK protocols. Several researchers constructed constant round ZK protocols for NP [BCY89] [FeSh89] [GoKa96] 2 [BJY97] . In particular, it is known that 4-round BSZK arguments exist for any NP language assuming the existence of one-way functions [BJY97] .
The lower bounds on the round complexity have been investigated from the practical and theoretical viewpoint. Goldreich and Oren proved that 1-round GMR-ZK or 2-round AIZK protocols exist only for BPP languages [GoOr94] . Their result can be easily extended to show that 1-round NUZK or 2-round AINUZK protocols exist only for P/poly languages. Furthermore, Goldreich and Krawczyk proved that only languages in BPP have 3-round BSZK protocols [GoKr96] 3 .
As mentioned above, almost all known ZK protocols are BSZK, where the simulator is only allowed to simply observe the input/output behavior of the cheating verifier. Also, there has been no known way to make use of the verifier's internal state so far. Therefore, many researchers considered that 4 is the minimal number of rounds required to satisfy the ZK property. However, since the argument in [GoKr96] uses the notion of black-box simulation in an essential way, their result does not apply to the weaker notions: NUZK, GMR-ZK, AINUZK and AIZK. That is, with respect to them, it is an interesting open problem whether there exists a 3-round ZK protocols for a non-trivial language. In other words, it asks whether there exists a non-black-box simulation technique which enables the simulator to make use of the internal state of any cheating verifier.
The main contribution of this paper is to provide such a non-black-box simulation technique. It is based on a non-standard computational assumption introduced by Damgård [Da91] 4 . We call it the DA-1. Loosely speaking, DA-1 says that, given randomly chosen instance of the discrete logarithm problem (p, q, g, g a ), it is infeasible to compute (B, X) such that X = B a mod p without knowing the value b satisfying B = g b mod p. Damgård used DA-1 to construct a practical publickey cryptosystem provably secure against chosen-ciphertext attack. Interestingly, he pointed out that DA-1 implied a non-black-box simulation technique. However, he did not present a 3-round ZK protocol for a non-trivial language.
Our Results
We construct a 3-round ZK protocol for any NP language by transforming a 3-round honest-verifier ZK protocol into another 3-round protocol satisfying the ZK property against any cheating verifier. Our transformation preserves the statistical zero-knowledgeness. That is, if the starting protocol is SZK, the resultant protocol is SZK as well. However, the perfect zero-knowledgeness can not be preserved.
Our proposed protocol is an interactive argument under DA-2 which is a variant of DA-1. We will show that, using our non-black-box simulation technique, it achieves different notions of ZK (NUZK, GMR-ZK, AINUZK, AIZK) under different variants of DA-1. Table 1 summarizes the 2 The ZK protocol constructed in [GoKa96] is a proof rather than an argument. 3 The discussion in [GoKr96] are for CZK proofs. However, their result extends to CZK arguments. See Remarks 6.3 and 6.5 in that paper.
4 [HT98] missed this reference since we were unaware of it.
achieved ZK notions. Unfortunately, all results are problematic since all variants of DA-1 have some kind of reverse-engineering property which seems to be unreasonable. In particular, the case of AIZK seems to be most problematic since uniform DA-1 w.r.t. auxiliary-input of non-restricted length has the strongest reverse-engineering property. We don't know whether one can get rid of the reverse-engineering property. It is still open whether one can construct a 3-round zero-knowledge protocol for a non-trivial language based on reasonable computational assumptions. 
Organization
In Section 2, we give the definitions of interactive arguments, several ZK notions, and some standard complexity assumptions. Section 3 describes our proposed protocol. In Section 4, we give Damgård's assumption and its variants. In Section 5, we prove the correctness of our protocol. In Section 6, we discuss the properties and the implications of our results. In Section 7, we conclude with some remarks.
Preliminaries
In this section, we give the definitions of ZK arguments and some standard complexity assumptions. Our notations for probabilistic machines, spaces and experiments follow [BeRo93] . If A is a probabilistic machine then A(x 1 , x 2 , · · ·) denotes the output distribution of A on inputs (x 1 , x 2 , · · ·). If S is any probability distribution then x ← S denotes the operation of selecting an element according to S. If S is a set then we use the same notation to denote the operation of picking an element x uniformly from S. For deterministic machines C (such as circuits), we write y = C(x 1 , x 2 , · · ·) to mean that the output of C on inputs (
denotes the probability that the predicate p(x 1 , x 2 , · · ·) is true after the ordered execution of the operation
We deal with NP languages and let W L (x) denote the witness set of x which belongs to an NP language L. We say that a function ν(·) : N → R is negligible if for every polynomial poly(·) and all sufficiently large n's, it holds that ν(n) < 1/poly(n). Also, we say that a function g(·) : N → R is overwhelming if g(·) = 1 − ν(·) for some negligible function ν(·).
Interactive Arguments
We consider two probabilistic polynomial-time interactive machines called the prover and the verifier. Initially both machines have access to a common input tape which includes x of length n. The prover and the verifier send messages to one another through two communication tapes. After exchanging a polynomial number of messages, the verifier stops in an accept state or in a reject state. Each machine, denoted by A, only sees its own tapes, namely, the common input tape, the random tape, the auxiliary-input tape and the communications tapes. Typically, the prover's auxiliary-input tape includes a witness w ∈ W L (x). Let A(x, y, m; R) denote A's next message when x is the common input, y the auxiliary-input, R the random coins and m the messages exchanged so far. We omit R when it is unnecessary to make the random coins explicit. That is, A(x, y, m) denotes the distribution of A's next message.
The view of the verifier V , denoted by [x, y, m; R], consists of the common input x, V 's auxiliaryinput y, V 's random coins R and the sequence m of messages exchanged by the prover and the verifier during the interaction. Let P (x, w), V (x, y) denote the probability distribution of V 's view when interacting with P on the common input x, where w is the auxiliary-input to P , and y the auxiliary-input to V . Let ρ V (x, m, R) denote the deterministic computation used by the prescribed verifier V to determine whether to accept or to reject. Let Acc P (x, w), V (x, y) denote the probability that P (x, w), V (x, y) is accepting, that is,
Definition 2.1 [interactive arguments [Go98a] ] Let P, V be two probabilistic polynomial-time interactive machines. We say that (P, V ) is an interactive argument for L if the following two conditions are satisfied:
For every x ∈ L, there exists a string w, Acc P (x, w), V (x, −) = 1.
-Computational Soundness: For every probabilistic polynomial-time machine P (the cheating prover), every polynomial poly(·), all sufficiently long x / ∈ L and all w's,
.
In both conditions, the auxiliary-input to the verifier V is empty. The auxiliary-input w to P is typically a witness of the common input x, i.e., w ∈ W L (x). We note that the cheating prover P is allowed to take an auxiliary-input. This simplifies the proof of the soundness of our proposed protocol in Section 5.
Zero-Knowledge
Here, we give the definitions of GMR-ZK, AIZK, NUZK and AINUZK. We first give a general definition and then define GMR-ZK and AIZK as special cases. We give the definitions of NUZK and AINUZK in the same way. Let P L (x) denote the set of strings w satisfying the efficient completeness condition with respect to x ∈ L. We basically follow the definition given in [Go98a] . Definition 2.2 [zero-knowledge w.r.t. auxiliary-input of length l ZK AI ] Let l ZK AI (·) be a polynomial. Let P, V be two probabilistic polynomial-time interactive machines. We say that (P, V ) is zero-knowledge w.r.t. auxiliary-input of length l ZK AI for L if for every probabilistic polynomial-time machine V (the cheating verifier), there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time machine S V (the simulator) such that the following two ensembles are computationally indistinguishable:
Namely, for every polynomial-size circuit family D = {D x,y } x∈L,y∈{0,1} l ZK AI (|x|) , every polynomial poly(·), all sufficiently long x ∈ L and all y ∈ {0, 1} l ZK AI (|x|) ,
If the above two ensembles are statistically close (resp., identical), we say that (P, V ) is statistical (resp., perfect) zero-knowledge w.r.t. auxiliary-input of length l ZK AI for L
We give the definitions of GMR-ZK and AIZK as special cases.
Definition 2.3 [GMR zero-knowledge]
We say that (P, V ) is GMR zero-knowledge for L if it is zero-knowledge w.r.t. auxiliary-input of length l ZK AI = 0 for L. We say that (P, V ) is GMR statistical (resp., perfect) zero-knowledge for L if it is statistical (resp., perfect) zero-knowledge w.r.t. auxiliary-input of length l ZK AI = 0 for L.
Definition 2.4 [auxiliary-input zero-knowledge] We say that (P, V ) is auxiliary-input zero-knowledge for L if for every polynomial l ZK AI , it is zero-knowledge w.r.t. auxiliary-input of length l ZK AI for L. We say that (P, V ) is auxiliary-input statistical (resp., perfect) zero-knowledge for L if for every polynomial l ZK AI , it is statistical (resp., perfect) zero-knowledge w.r.t. auxiliary-input of length l ZK AI for L.
Next, we define NUZK and AINUZK in the same way. They are non-uniform variants of GMR-ZK and AIZK.
Definition 2.5 [non-uniform zero-knowledge w.r.t. auxiliary-input of length l ZK AI ] Let l ZK AI (·) be a polynomial. Let P, V be two probabilistic polynomial-time interactive machines. We say that (P, V ) is non-uniform zero-knowledge w.r.t. auxiliary-input of length l ZK AI for L if for every polynomial-size circuit family V (the cheating verifier), there exists a probabilistic polynomialsize circuit family S V (the simulator) such that the following two ensembles are computationally indistinguishable:
If the above two ensembles are statistically close (resp., identical), we say that (P, V ) is non-uniform statistical (resp., perfect) zero-knowledge w.r.t. auxiliary-input of length l ZK AI for L We note that the simulator (polynomial-size circuit family) is allowed to toss the random coins. That is, the simulator takes an auxiliary-input which is uniformly selected. Otherwise, two ensembles are always distinguishable since the output of the simulator is deterministic. Definition 2.6 [non-uniform zero-knowledge] We say that (P, V ) is non-uniform zero-knowledge for L if it is non-uniform zero-knowledge w.r.t. auxiliary-input of length l ZK AI = 0 for L. We say that (P, V ) is non-uniform statistical (resp., perfect) zero-knowledge for L if it is non-uniform statistical (resp., perfect) zero-knowledge w.r.t. auxiliary-input of length l ZK AI = 0 for L. Definition 2.7 [auxiliary-input non-uniform zero-knowledge] We say that (P, V ) is auxiliary-input non-uniform zero-knowledge for L if for every polynomial l ZK AI (·), it is non-uniform zero-knowledge w.r.t. auxiliary-input of length l ZK AI for L. We say that (P, V ) is auxiliary-input non-uniform statistical (resp., perfect) zero-knowledge for L if for every polynomial l ZK AI (·), it is non-uniform statistical (resp., perfect) zero-knowledge w.r.t. auxiliary-input of length l ZK AI for L.
We remark that in all definitions above, it is not required that, given a verifier V , the simulator S V can be effectively constructed, but rather that it exists.
DLA and DHA
We give two complexity assumptions related to the discrete logarithm problem. All exponentiations in this paper are in Z * p . The definition of the prime p will be clear by the context. To simplify the notations, we omit the expression "mod p".
First, we recall the discrete logarithm assumption (DLA). In this paper, we need a stronger formulation (than usual one) in which we assume nothing on the distribution of the prime p and the base g. Definition 2.8 Let L P QG denote the set {(p, q, g)} of primes and generators, where p and q are primes such that p = 2q + 1 and g is an element of order q in Z * p (a generator of a subgroup of Z * p of order q).
L P QG can be recognized in probabilistic polynomial-time with negligible error probability by testing primality for p and q in probabilistic polynomial-time [SS77] [Ra80], and verifying that g is not the identity and that g q = 1. Furthermore, there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time machine which, on input 1 n , outputs (p, q, g) ∈ L P QG such that p is of length n. Assumption 2.9 [non-uniform DLA] For every family of polynomial-size circuits I = {I n } n≥1 , every polynomial poly(·), all sufficiently large n's and all (p, q, g) ∈ L P QG such that p is of length n,
Next, we give the definition of the Diffie-Hellman assumption (DHA) which says that the DiffieHellman problem [DH76] is intractable in the same setting as the above definition of DLA. Assumption 2.10 [non-uniform DHA] For every family of polynomial-size circuits I = {I n } n≥1 , every polynomial poly(·), all sufficiently large n's and all (p, q, g) ∈ L P QG such that p is of length n,
Although uniform DLA and uniform DHA are defined analogously, we omit them here.
Protocol 3R-ZK
In this section, we describe a 3-round ZK protocol (called the 3R-ZK) for any NP language. We construct it by combining two transformations.
The Starting Point
Our starting point is a 3-round honest-verifier ZK protocol (A, B) for an NP-complete language L. We call it the 3R-HVZK. Let M 1 , Y, M 2 denote the messages exchanged in the protocol. M 1 and M 2 are the first and the second messages sent by the prover, respectively. Y is the message sent by the verifier. We require that the protocol 3R-HVZK satisfies the following properties.
B0. The message Y is chosen uniformly at random from a polynomially sampleable subdomain D Y of {0, 1} n , where n is the length of the common input x.
B1. The prover A can be implemented in probabilistic polynomial-time when it is given as its auxiliary-input an NP witness w ∈ L W (x).
B2. It satisfies a strong soundness property which requires that for every common input x / ∈ L and every possible first message M 1 , there exists at most one verifier's message Y such that the prover can answer properly in its second message M 2 . This means that if the size of D Y is superpolynomial in n then the probability that the verifier accepts x / ∈ L is negligible.
B3. It satisfies the ZK property with respect to a prescribed verifier B, i.e., honest-verifier zeroknowledge (HVZK). That is, there exists a simulator which produces a probability distribution computationally indistinguishable from the distribution of the real view of B.
The typical example of 3R-HVZK is the parallel composition of Blum's ZK protocol for the Hamiltonian circuit problem [Bl86] (See Appendix A). The following theorem summarizes our starting point.
Theorem 3.1 [Starting point [Bl86] ] Assuming the existence of non-uniformly secure commitment scheme, there exists a 3-round protocol (A, B) satisfying the properties B0, B1, B2 and B3 for any NP language.
The Preliminary Transformation
In the preliminary transformation, we just modify 3R-HVZK so that the message Y of the verifier are randomly chosen from a domain D Y specified by the first message of the prover. We denote by (P ,V ) the resultant protocol.
Protocol: (P ,V ) for an NP-complete language L.
Common Input: a common input x of length n.
Prover's Aux-Input: an NP witness w in W L (x).
P1:
The proverP generates an instance (p, q, g) ∈ L P QG such that p is of length n.P also computes M 1 according to (A, B). ThenP sends (M 1 , p, q, g) to the verifierV .
V1:V checks whether (p, q, g) is in L P QG and p is of length n. If this is true thenV chooses Y uniformly at random in a subgroup of Z * p of order q and send Y toP . P2:P computes M 2 according to (A, B) and sends it toV .
V2:V checks whether M 2 is valid according to (A, B). If this is true thenV accepts, otherwiseV rejects.
It is easy to see that the protocol (P ,V ) satisfies the properties B1, B2 and B3. B1 and B2 are clearly satisfied. B3 is also satisfied because of the properties B0 and B3 of 3R-HVZK. We restate the property B3 of (P ,V ) formally as follows:
B3. For the prescribed verifierV , there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time simulator S HV (the honest-verifier simulator) such that the following two ensembles are computationally indistinguishable:
Namely, for every polynomial-size circuit family D = {D x } x∈L , every polynomial poly(·), and all sufficiently long x ∈ L,
We
We use this honest-verifier simulator S HV to demonstrate the zero-knowledge property of 3R-ZK in Section 5,
The Main Transformation
Now we present our main transformation. Before describing it, we roughly review the approach used by Feige and Shamir to construct a 4-round ZK protocol for NP [FeSh89] . First of all, their protocol is a "secret-coin" protocol. That is, the messages sent by the verifier are not just random coins, but they are computed using secret random coins. Their protocol satisfies the following properties.
R1. The verifier proves to the prover that he knows the secret coins inducing the messages sent by him.
R2.
A simulator is able to get the secret coins used by the cheating verifier no matter how he behaves. Furthermore, once the simulator get the secret coins, the simulation is easy to complete. As a result, the ZK property is satisfied.
R3. Any cheating prover can not get the secret coins. Furthermore, the protocol is designed so that the computational soundness is satisfied under this property.
In [FeSh89] , these properties have been implemented using the notion of witness-hiding proofs of knowledge [FeSh90] [BeGo92]. The verifier executes a witness-hiding proof of knowledge of the secret coins. The property R3 is satisfied by the witness-hiding property [FeSh90] . R1 and R2 are also satisfied by the notion of "proof of knowledge" [BeGo92] . That is, the simulator is able to extract the secret coins of the cheating verifier by using it as a black-box and "rewinding" it. The computational soundness condition is satisfied simultaneously since any cheating prover is not allowed to "rewind" the verifier.
We follow their approach to construct 3R-ZK, but the notion of witness hiding proofs does not seem useful for our purpose since proofs of knowledge require an interaction (i.e., the verifier must send at least two messages) which we can not afford here. Nevertheless, we overcome this problem using a non-standard computational assumption introduced by Damgård [Da91] . Now we transform (P ,V ) into our proposed protocol 3R-ZK (P, V ) satisfying all properties R1, R2 and R3.
Protocol: 3R-ZK (P, V ) for an NP-complete language L.
P1:
The prover P computes the first message as follows:
P1-2: P generates uniformly a random number a ∈ Z q and computes A = g a .
P sends (M 1 , p, q, g, A) to the verifier V .
V1: V checks whether (p, q, g) is in L P QG and p is of length n. If this is true then V generates a random number b ∈ Z q , computes (B, X) = (g b , A b ) and sends (B, X) to P . Otherwise V rejects. Note that b is the secret-coin used by V .
P2: P checks whether X = B a . If this is false then P stops, otherwise P computes the second message as follows:
P2-1: P generates a random number c ∈ Z q and computes (C, Y ) = (g c , B c ) (These may also be computed as (C, Y ) = (A c , X c )).
P2-2:
According to (P ,V ), P computes M 2 using Y as the message sent byV .
V2: V checks whether the following two conditions are satisfied:
V2-2: According to (P ,V ), V checks whether M 2 is valid using Y as the message sent byV .
If either condition is violated then V rejects, otherwise V accepts.
We explain that 3R-ZK satisfies all properties R1, R2, and R3. We can make the following observation on the computation of V in V1: It seems that any cheating verifier must start by simply choosing b and compute (g b , A b ) in order to pass the check X = B a by the prover in P2. That is, we assume that the verifier knows the secret coins b whenever it holds that X = B a . This means that the property R1 is satisfied. Informally, this assumption can be defined as follows: For any cheating verifier V , there exists another verifier V ′ who outputs not only (B, X) but also the secret coins b whenever V outputs (B, X) satisfying X = B a . Therefore, a simulator is able to get the secret coins b by using V ′ as a black-box rather than V . Once the simulator gets b, the simulation is easy to do since given Y and b, it is easy to compute the message C such that Y = C b . As a result, the property R2 is satisfied. We stress that the simulator does not use the cheating verifier V as a black-box. The above assumption is very similar to the one proposed by Damgård in [Da91] which we call the DA-1. However, precisely speaking, it is different from DA-1 due to the common input x, the message M 1 and the auxiliary-input y to the cheating verifier. We must augment DA-1 by an auxiliary-input in order to demonstrate the ZK property.
The random coins b used by V are kept secret from any cheating prover if we assume that it is computationally intractable to compute b from (g, A, B, X). Now we focus on the computation of P in P2-1. As in the case of the computation of V in V1, it seems that any cheating prover must start by simply choosing c and compute either (g c , B c ) or (A c , X c ) in order to pass the check Y = C b by the verifier in V2-1 (Note that there are two ways of computing (C, Y ) in P2-1 to pass it). We assume that the prover knows the value of c such that Y = B c or X c whenever it holds Y = C b . We call this assumption the DA-2, which is defined informally as follows: For any cheating prover P , there exists another prover P ′ who outputs not only (C, Y ) but also the secret coins c whenever P outputs (C, Y ) satisfying Y = C b . Assume that the computational soundness is not satisfied. Then, given a fixed message Y , the cheating prover P must compute the second message C satisfying Y = C b for randomly chosen (B, X). Under DA-2, this means that, given a fixed message Y , P ′ can compute C and its discrete logarithm c such that Y = B c or X c for randomly chosen (B, X). This contradicts DLA. Therefore, the property R3 is satisfied.
The above observations roughly show that 3R-ZK is a ZK argument for L. The formal proofs are given in Section 5. Before giving it, we review the formal definitions of DA-1 and give several augmentations of DA-1 in next section.
Damgård's Assumption and Its Variants
In this section, we review Damgård's assumption introduced in [Da91] and give its variants. As described in the previous section, there are two versions: DA-1 and DA-2. They are required for the ZK property and the computational soundness, respectively. First, we give the definitions of DA-1. Then we augment DA-1 by an auxiliary-input. Lastly, we give the definition of DA-2.
DA-1
DA-1 can be formulated both in the uniform model and in the non-uniform model as other computational assumptions. The original assumption in [Da91] is called uniform DA-1 formalized as follows:
Assumption 4.1 [uniform DA-1 [Da91] ] Let M be a probabilistic polynomial-time machine which takes as input (p, q, g, g a ) and tries to output (B, X) such that X = B a . For every probabilistic polynomial-time machine M , there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time machine M ′ which, on input (p, q, g, g a ), outputs (B ′ , X ′ , b) satisfying the following two conditions.
1.
Assume that M and M ′ use the same random coins. Then, for every (p, q, g) ∈ L P QG , it holds that
2. For every polynomial poly(·), all sufficiently large n's and every (p, q, g) ∈ L P QG such that p is of length n,
Roughly, the above conditions say that whenever M outputs (B, X) such that X = B a , M ′ outputs not only (B, X) but also b such that B = g b (i.e., X = (g a ) b ) with overwhelming probability.
The non-uniform DA-1 is formalized as follows.
Assumption 4.2 [non-uniform DA-1] Let M = {M n } n≥1 be a polynomial-size circuit family which takes as input (p, q, g, g a ) and tries to output (B, X) such that X = B a , where M n runs on p of length n. For every polynomial-size circuit family M = {M n } n≥1 , there exists a polynomial-size circuit family M ′ = {M ′ n } n≥1 which, on input (p, q, g, g a ), outputs (B ′ , X ′ , b) satisfying the following two conditions.
For every
Clearly, uniform DA-1 implies non-uniform DA-1, but we don't know whether the reverse implication holds. The proposition below shows that the combination of DA-1 and DLA implies DHA. However, it is unlikely that the reverse implication holds. Proposition 4.3 Under uniform DA-1 and uniform DLA, uniform DHA holds. Under non-uniform DA-1 and non-uniform DLA, non-uniform DHA holds.
Proof:
We give the proof only in the uniform case. Assume that uniform DHA does not hold. Then there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time machine M which, on input p, q, g, A = g a , B = g b , outputs B = g b and X = g ab with not negligible probability. Applying uniform DA-1 to this machine M , we have another probabilistic polynomial-time machine M ′ which, on inputs p, q, g, A = g a , B = g b , outputs not only (B, X) but also the discrete logarithm b such that B = g b . This contradicts uniform DLA.
Augmenting DA-1 by Auxiliary-Input
We need several variants of DA-1 in order to prove that 3R-ZK satisfies the ZK property. They say that DA-1 holds even when M is allowed to take an auxiliary-input. We first give a general augmentation of DA-1 and then give two assumptions as special cases. One is called DA-1 w.r.t. auxiliary-input of non-restricted length. The other is called DA-1 w.r.t. auxiliary-input of restricted length. The former requires that DA-1 holds when M is allowed to take an auxiliary-input of any polynomial length. On the other hand, the latter requires that DA-1 holds when M is allowed to take an auxiliary-input of pre-specified length. Clearly, the former is stronger than the latter. We note that these variants have some kind of reverse-engineering property. This issue is taken up in Section 6. Here, we give the definitions only in the non-uniform model. Uniform definitions are defined analogously, but we omit them here.
Assumption 4.4 [non-uniform DA-1 w.r.t. auxiliary-input of length l DA AI ] Let l DA AI (·) be a polynomial. Let M = {M n } n≥1 be a polynomial-size circuit family which takes as input (p, q, g, g a , aux) and tries to output (B, X) such that X = B a , where M n runs on p of length n. For every polynomial-size circuit family M = {M n } n≥1 , there exists a polynomial-size circuit family M ′ = {M ′ n } n≥1 which, on input (p, q, g, g a ), outputs (B ′ , X ′ , b) satisfying the following two conditions.
1.
For every (p, q, g) ∈ L P QG and every aux ∈ {0, 1} l DA AI (n) , it holds that
2. For every polynomial poly(·), all sufficiently large n's, every (p, q, g) ∈ L P QG such that p is of length n and every aux ∈ {0, 1} l DA AI (n) ,
. These variants clearly imply non-uniform DA-1, but we don't know whether the reverse implications hold.
DA-2
We formulate DA-2 in the non-uniform model. Although uniform DA-2 is formulated similarly, we do not need it in this paper.
Assumption 4.7 [non-uniform DA-2] Let M be a polynomial-time circuit family which takes as input (p, q, g, g a , g b , g ab ) and tries to output (C, Y ) such that Y = C b , where M n runs on p of length n. For every polynomial-size circuit family M = {M n } n≥1 , there exists a polynomial-size circuit family M ′ = {M ′ n } n≥1 which takes as input (p, q, g, g a , g b , g ab ) and outputs (C ′ , Y ′ , c) satisfying the following two conditions. For every (p, q, g ) ∈ L P QG such that p is of length n and every a ∈ Z q , it holds that
1.
2. For every polynomial poly(·), all sufficiently large n's, every (p, q, g) ∈ L P QG such that p is of length n and every a ∈ Z q ,
Roughly, the above conditions say that whenever
e., C = g c or (g a ) c ) with overwhelming probability.
Although it is clear that DA-2 implies DA-1, we don't know whether the reverse implication holds.
In all assumptions above, it is not required that, given M , M ′ can be effectively constructed, but rather that it exists. This is reminiscent of the definitions of ZK given in Section 2.
Remark 4.8 DA-1 and DA-2 are fundamentally different from the standard complexity assumptions such as DLA and DHA in the sense that they have double quantification (i.e., for every adversary, there exists another one such that something holds), whereas the standard assumptions have only one quantifier (i.e., for every adversary, something holds). It is unlikely that they are proved to hold under standard complexity assumptions. We believe that it is interesting to study their validity.
Correctness of 3R-ZK
Theorem 5.1 summarizes the properties of our proposed protocol 3R-ZK. (0) an argument for L under non-uniform DA-2 and non-uniform DLA.
(1) NUZK for L under non-uniform DA-1 w.r.t auxiliary-input of restricted length.
(2) AINUZK for L under non-uniform DA-1 w.r.t auxiliary-input of non-restricted length.
Proof: Combining Lemma 5.2, 5.8, 5.9, 5.11, and 5.12, Theorem 5.1 follows.
Combining Theorem 3.1 and 5.1, it follows that there exists a 3-round ZK interactive argument for any NP language under non-uniform DLA, non-uniform DA-2 and the above variants of uniform and non-uniform DA-1.
3R-ZK is an Argument
Lemma 5.2 [3R-ZK is an argument] Assume 3R-HVZK satisfies the properties B1 and B2. Then 3R-ZK is an argument for L under non-uniform DA-2 and non-uniform DLA.
Proof: We need to show that 3R-ZK satisfies both the efficient completeness and the computational soundness. The efficient completeness is trivially satisfied because of the property B1 of (P ,V ). Therefore, we focus on the proof of the computational soundness.
Assume that 3R-ZK does not have negligible error probability in the computational soundness. Then there exist a cheating prover P , a polynomial p 0 (·) and an infinite set G = {(x, w)} of common inputs not in L and auxiliary-inputs such that for every (x, w) ∈ G, we have
Roughly speaking, G is a set of common inputs and auxiliary-inputs violating the computational soundness. In order to complete the proof, we will show that this contradicts non-uniform DLA under non-uniform DA-2.
Without loss of generality, we may assume that P is deterministic since P is allowed to take a non-uniform auxiliary-input w. Therefore, we may assume that the first message sent by P is predetermined for each (x, w) ∈ G (i.e., the auxiliary-input w may include it). From now on, we denote by (M 1 , p, q, g, A = g a ) the predetermined first message sent by P on inputs (x, w). For simplicity, we also assume that (p, q, g) is in L P QG since the probability that P succeeds to cheat V is negligible for any (p, q, g) / ∈ L P QG .
Let K be the set of all integers n for which G contains a common input x of length n. We construct an inverter I = {I n } n∈K such that for all sufficiently large n ∈ K, there exists a triplet (p, q, g) ∈ L P QG such that p is of length n and
is overwhelming. Before describing the inverter I, we claim that under non-uniform DA-2, for any (deterministic) cheating prover P , there exists a polynomial-size circuit family P ′ who outputs not only (C, Y ) but also c in Step P2. I uses P ′ as a subroutine. Formally, the claim is as follows:
Claim 5.3 Assume non-uniform DA-2 holds. Then for any polynomial-time machine P (the cheating prover), there exists a polynomial-size circuit family P ′ = { P ′ n } n≥1 which takes as input (p, q, g, g a , g b , g ab ) and outputs (M 2 , C ′ , Y ′ , c) satisfying the following two conditions.
1.
For every x and every w of polynomial length in |x|, it holds that
2. For every polynomial poly(·), all sufficiently large n's, every x of length n and every w of polynomial length in n,
Proof: We focus on the computation of the prover P in P2, where the inputs are 9 strings (x, w, M 1 , p, q, g, A = g a , B = g b , X = g ab ).
On the other hand, in non-uniform DA-2, the inputs to M are only 6 strings (p, q, g, A = g a , B = g b , X = g ab ). However, we may consider that the 3 extra inputs (x, w, M 1 ) are incorporated into M n . Therefore, we can apply non-uniform DA-2 to the computation of P so that there exists the above circuit family P ′ .
Now we describe the inverter I = {I n } n∈K which uses P ′ as a subroutine to solve the discrete logarithm problems. For simplicity, we describe the circuit I n as a probabilistic polynomial-time machine with non-uniform advice strings of polynomial length in n. The random coins used can be eliminated later by the non-uniformity.
Circuit: I n (n ∈ K).
Input: (p, q, g) and β(= g α ), where (p, q, g) is a part of the first message sent by P on inputs (x, w) ∈ G and (x, p) are of length n.
Advice: (M 1 , A = g a , a) and the description of the circuit P ′ n . Output: The discrete logarithm α such that β = g α .
Step 1: I n generates a random number b ∈ Z q and computes (B, X) = (βg b , (βg b ) a ).
Step 2: I n runs P ′ n on (p, q, g, A, B, X) to get its response (M 2 , C, Y, c). I n checks whether (M 1 , Y, M 2 ) is accepting according to (P ,V ). If this is false, I n goes back to Step 1, otherwise I n goes to Step 3.
Step 3: I n checks whether Y = B c or Y = X c . If this is false, I n goes back to Step 1, otherwise I n goes to Step 4.
Step 4: I n generates a random number
Otherwise, I n goes to Step 5.
Step 5: As in Step 2,
2 ) is accepting according to (P ,V ). If this is false, I n goes back to Step 4, otherwise I n goes to Step 6.
Step 6: I n checks whether
If this is false, I n goes back to Step 4, otherwise I n goes to Step 7.
Step 7: I n outputs α such that β = g α .
Intuitively, I n tries to find two different accepting conversations in Step 1-6. Once they are found, I n can easily compute α such that β = g α in Step 7. Note that in Step 7, it holds that Y = β ac g abc or β c g bc and it also holds that Y ′ = g ab ′ c ′ or g b ′ c ′ . Furthermore, Y must equal Y ′ by the strong soundness B2 of (P ,V ) since x / ∈ L. As a result, it is easy to computes α from the values (a, b, b ′ , c, c ′ ).
Lastly, we need to analyze the expected running time of I n . Recall that we assumed that
By the first condition of Claim 5.3, the probability that I n passes the checks in Step 2 and 5 is at least 1/p 0 (n). Furthermore, the second condition of Claim 5.3 guarantees that the probability that I n passes the check in Step 3 (resp., Step 6) under the condition that I n has already passed Step 2 (resp., Step 5) is negligible for all sufficiently large n ∈ K. Therefore, the expected running time of
where t i (n) is a polynomial bounding the running time of Step i. As a result, we conclude that for all sufficiently large n ∈ K, there exists a triplet (p, q, g) ∈ L P QG such that p is of length n and
is overwhelming. This contradicts non-uniform DLA.
3R-ZK is Zero-Knowledge
We first give a general lemma (Lemma 5.4) in the non-uniform model and then give two lemmas (Lemma 5.8 and 5.9) as special cases.
Lemma 5.4 Let l ZK AI (·) be a polynomial. Let l x,M 1 (·) denote a polynomial bounding the length of (x, M 1 ). We denote by l DA AI (·) the polynomial such that l DA AI (n) = l ZK AI (n) + l x,M 1 (n). Assume that 3R-HVZK satisfies the properties B0 and B3. Then 3R-ZK is non-uniform zeroknowledge w.r.t. auxiliary-input of length l ZK AI for L under non-uniform DA-1 w.r.t. auxiliaryinput of length l DA AI .
Proof: Firstly, we apply non-uniform DA-1 w.r.t. auxiliary-input of length l DA AI to the computation of the cheating verifier V in V1.
Claim 5.5 Assume that non-uniform DA-1 w.r.t. auxiliary-input of length l DA AI holds. Then for every polynomial-size circuit family V = { V n } n≥1 (the cheating verifier), there exists another polynomial-size circuit family V ′ = { V ′ n } n≥1 which, on input (x, y, M 1 , p, q, g, g a ), outputs (B ′ , X ′ , b) satisfying the following two conditions.
1.
For every x ∈ L, every w ∈ W L (x) and every y ∈ {0, 1} l ZK AI (|x|) , it holds that
2. For every polynomial poly(·), all sufficiently large n's, every x ∈ L of length n, w ∈ W L (x) and every y ∈ {0, 1} l ZK AI (|x|) ,
:
Proof: In the computation of V , the inputs are x, y, M 1 , p, q, g and A. If we consider (x, y, M 1 ) as the auxiliary-input of length l DA AI (n) in non-uniform DA-1 w.r.t auxiliary-input of length l DA AI then the claim clearly holds.
As described in the observation of the property R2 (in Section 3.3), we can construct the simulator S V = {S n } n≥1 which uses V ′ = { V ′ n } n≥1 as a subroutine so that it is able to get the secret coins b used by V and complete the simulation using b. S V also uses the honest-verifier simulator S HV for (P ,V ) as a subroutine. For simplicity, we describe S V as a probabilistic polynomial-time machine with a non-uniform advice string of polynomial length in n.
Circuit: S n .
Input: (x, y), where x ∈ L is of length n and y is of length l ZK AI (n).
Step 1: S n runs S HV on input x to get the view ofV
where Y is an element of order q in Z * p .
Step 2: S n generates a uniformly at random in Z q and computes A = g a .
Step 3: S n runs V ′ (x, y, (M 1 , p, q, g, A)) to get (B, X, b).
Step 4: S n checks whether X = B a . If this is true, S n goes to Step 5, otherwise, S n stops and outputs [x, y, (M 1 , p, q, g, A)(B, X); −].
Step 5: S n checks whether B = g b . If this is true, S n goes to Step 6, otherwise, S n aborts.
Step 6: S n computes C such that Y = C b .
Step 7:
Clearly, S n runs in probabilistic polynomial-time. Moreover, the second condition of Claim 5.5 guarantees that the probability that S V aborts in Step 5 is negligible.
In order to complete the proof, we show that the simulator S V outputs a view computationally indistinguishable from the real view between P and V .
Claim 5.6 The distribution ensemble {S V (x)} x∈L,y∈{0,1} l ZK AI (|x|) is computationally indistinguish-
Proof: The proof is by contradiction. Assume there exists a distinguisher D that can distinguish
Then we can construct a distinguisher D ′ that distinguishes the distribution ensemble
in contradiction to the property B3 of (P ,V 
Output: 0 or 1.
Step Step 2: D ′ n invokes D n on this extended view.
If the input is from { P (x, w),V (x, −) } x∈L,w∈W L (x) , the extended view is distributed statistically close to { P (x, w), V (x, −) } x∈L,y∈{0,1} l ZK AI (|x|) because of the following two facts:
1. The probability that S V aborts in Step 5 is negligible.
2. The output distributions of V and V ′ are identical on (B, X) by the first condition of Claim 5.5.
On the other hand, if the input is from {S HV (x)} x∈L , the extended view is clearly identical to the distribution ensemble {S V (x, y)} x∈L,y∈{0,1} l ZK AI (|x|) .
Therefore, D ′ distinguishes the two distribution ensembles {S HV (x)} x∈L and { P (x, w),V (x, −) } x∈L,w∈W L (x) in contradiction to the property B3 of (P ,V ).
Lemma 5.4 follows.
Remark 5.7 Claim 5.5 does not say that V ′ can be effectively constructed given V , but rather that it exists. However, it is sufficient since the definition of NUZK w.r.t. auxiliary input of length l ZK AI also does not require that S V can be effectively constructed given V .
The following lemmas are easily obtained as special cases of Lemma 5.4.
Lemma 5.8 [3R-ZK is NUZK] Assume that 3R-HVZK satisfies the properties B0 and B3. Then 3R-ZK is non-uniform zero-knowledge under non-uniform DA-1 w.r.t. auxiliary-input of restricted length.
Therefore, it is still open whether one can construct a 3-round zero-knowledge protocol for a nontrivial language based on reasonable computational assumptions. We believe that it is interesting to resolve the situation either way: Either provide a plausible construction based on reasonable computational assumptions, or prove that some kind of reverse-engineering property is essential for 3-round ZK protocols for non-trivial languages.
A Blum's Zero-Knowledge Protocol for the Hamiltonian Circuit Problem
The following protocol is an atomic ZK interactive proof for the Hamiltonian circuit problem [Bl86] [Go98a].
Protocol: 3R-HVZK for the Hamiltonian Circuit Problem.
Common Input: a graph G = (V, E) of size n, V = {1, 2, · · · , |V |}.
Prover's Aux-Input: a permutation φ over V representing the order of vertices along a Hamiltonian circuit, i.e., φ(1),φ(2),· · ·,φ(|V |),φ(1) represent a Hamiltonian circuit.
P1:
The prover chooses a random permutation π over V and generates an isomorphic copy G ′ = π(G) = (V, E ′ ). For each pair (j, k) ∈ V 2 , p i sets e j,k = 1 if (j, k) ∈ E ′ and e j,k = 0 otherwise. The prover computes a commitment x j,k = E(e j,k , r j,k ) for each e j,k and sends all the x j,k 's to the verifier. E(·, ·) is a non-uniformly secure encryption function and used for a bit-commitment scheme. Let m 1 denote this first message.
V1:
The verifier selects a random bit y and sends it to the prover.
P2:
If the prover receives y = 0, the prover reveals all the commitments x j,k 's, i.e., sends e j,k , r j,k for each j, k and π to the verifier. If the prover receives y = 1, the prover reveals only |V | commitments, specifically those corresponding to the Hamiltonian circuit in G ′ , i.e., sends φ ′ (·) = π(φ(·)) and r φ ′ (1),φ ′ (2) , r φ ′ (2),φ ′ (3) ,· · ·, r φ ′ (|V |),φ ′ (1) to the verifier. Let m 0 2 and m 1 2 denote the messages in the case of y = 0 and y = 1, respectively.
V2:
In case of y = 0, the verifier accepts if all the commitments are revealed correctly and indeed correspond to the graph π(G). In case of y = 1, the verifier accepts if it holds that x φ ′ (1),φ ′ (2) = E(1, r φ ′ (1),φ ′ (2) ), x φ ′ (2),φ ′ (3) = E(1, r φ ′ (2),φ ′ (3) ), · · ·, x φ ′ (|V |),φ ′ (1) = E(1, r φ ′ (|V |),φ ′ (1) ).
The above atomic protocol has constant error probability 1 2 . The following parallel composition is used to decrease the error probability while maintaining the number of rounds. In the above, the message Y is chosen uniformly at random in {0, 1} n , but it may be chosen from any polynomially sampleable subdomain of {0, 1} n .
B A Flaw in CRYPTO'98 version [HT98]
We wrongly identified the following assumptions:
• non-uniform DA-1 (called SDHA-1 in [HT98] ).
• non-uniform DA-1 w.r.t. auxiliary-input of restricted length.
• non-uniform DA-1 w.r.t. auxiliary-input of non-restricted length.
As a result, we wrongly claimed that 3R-ZK achieves the notion of AINUZK under non-uniform DA-1 (Lemma 12 in [HT98] ).
